



Secularization and Its Vicissitudes in Georgia
The formation of modern nations is directly linked to the parallel and 
mutually dependent processes of secularization and modernization. It is im-
possible to speak of the formation of Georgia as a nation state without dis-
cussing these. A reading of modern Georgian history from this angle should 
assist us in answering many still unanswered questions, to the extent that 
current political development is directly linked to that historical process 
which began in the nineteenth century, the aim of which was the formation 
of a new Georgian national and state self-awareness. In the present paper, it 
is particularly through the prism of secularization that we will discuss the 
history of the establishment of the Georgian state.
Let us first of all recall several significant moments in recent Georgian 
political history which, in our view, are directly linked to a complex of themes 
at whose poles we may place secularization and counter-secularization.
On 11 October, 2007, the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia II, an-
nounced a political initiative which was supported by a large portion of the 
population and by the majority of opposition parties. In the Patriarch’s view, 
the restoration of the monarchy (the introduction of a constitutional monar-
chy) would become a decisive factor in the restoration of territorial integrity 
and in national integration. The Patriarch’s initiative might have appeared as 
a chance occurrence in Georgian political discourse had it not been one of a 
series of political articulations. This series superficially demonstrates a con-
frontation between the authorities, the opposition and society, and hints at a 
profound unity on the level of the mechanism of political thinking.
Following his inauguration in 2004 as the new Georgian president, 
Mikheil Saakashvili took an oath on the grave of Davit Aghmashenebeli. On 
a visit to Germany shortly afterwards, in response to the question as to which 
Europe Georgia belonged – Old or New – he replied that Georgia belonged 
to the Oldest Europe.  
 For its part, Mikheil Saakashvili’s inauguration was a continuation of 
a resacralization implanted by Eduard Shevardnadze in a political represen-
tation (Shevardnadze’s inauguration was held in Svetitskhoveli Cathedral in 
1995), which means the introduction of historical and religious legitimacy 
on the other side of the façade of the modern state. 
It is difficult to consider this series of political statements as a chance oc-
currence. All these statements and performative acts have one common char-
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acteristic: their vectors are orientated towards the past and they strengthen 
the customary form of legitimacy for a democratic state (elections), from 
time to time exchanging these for forms of historical and religious legitima-
cy. It is insufficient simply to call historical or religious legitimacy an anach-
ronism, and a deeper analysis is required. Here we are directly approaching 
our topic: secularization and its role in the formation of the modern state.
The process of secularization began in Western Europe in the Late Mid-
dle Ages and its ultimate outcome was to alter the paradigm of the whole 
socio-political order, which culminated in the formation of new nations and 
civil societies. The first portents of this process are apparent in Renaissance 
culture, when secular or earthly themes broke the monopoly of sacral themes 
in the fine arts and literature, and set about making them earthly1. 
This process of making earthly soon spread to political thinking, some-
thing which provoked the collapse of medieval political theology. Collec-
tive identity in the Christian world is based on two basic postulates. First 
and foremost is the Eucharistic unity of the Christian people, which is built 
on the words of the Apostle Paul ‘you are the body of Christ’ (1 Corinthi-
ans 12:27) and whose embodiment is the Church2. A new term – corpus 
mysticum – appears in twelfth-century Europe to denote this3. The second 
fundamental postulate is the loyalty of the Church to the consecrated mon-
arch. The ‘king’s immortal body’4 is his kingdom. According to priests in fif-
teenth-century England, the realm in particular is considered corpus mysti-
cum, where intencio populi (the people’s will) already occupies a central po-
sition5. This already signified the start of secularization. The Enlightenment 
played a decisive role in this direction. Medieval Christian political theology 
is discredited by the theoreticians of the Enlightenment in particular as the 
main ideological principle of the authorities, as is the monarchical absolut-
ism that harmonized with this as the authorities’ sole legitimate form. Par-
ticularly noteworthy is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of le peuple souver-
ain (‘the sovereign people’) who occupy the place of the monarch as the sole 
legitimate ruler. In France ‘the sovereign people’ condemn the king to death 
which, on a symbolic level, has the character of a sacrificial offering to create 
a new subject of loyalty, patria, expressed almost word for word by Robespi-
erre: ‘Louis [Louis XVI, King of France – authors’ note] must die so that the 
country may live’. As Pierre Klossowski says, sentencing the king to death is 
a simulacrum of the killing of God6. With the ‘killing of God’, political theol-
ogy as a theocentric ideological system loses a buttress. The fatherland occu-
pies the place of God as the highest subject of legitimacy. This makes earth-
ly – that is to say, makes secular – the state as the form of the political unity 
and organization of the sovereign people. It is on such earthly soil that new 
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nations are created, who already invent their own new national narratives. 
However, this invention for the most part repeats the structure of sacral nar-
ratives and has the appearance of being a kind of ‘translation’ of these – in 
other words, sacral symbology is replaced by the national. This process fol-
lowed its own particular path in every country.
‘A Present Born of the Past’
Unlike Europe, the idea of Georgian statehood up to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century knew only a single form, that of a monarchy based on 
medieval political theology and linked inseparably to the Bagrationi dynasty. 
The abolition of the Georgian monarchy in 1801 assumed in the collective 
memory the character of a kind of traumatic fixation and, to a significant ex-
tent, this became a determinant of those processes which occurred in Geor-
gian political consciousness during the subsequent two centuries and which 
also occur today. We borrow the term ‘traumatic fixation’ from the lexicon 
of psychoanalysis and, in our case, it denotes a certain psychic mechanism 
which directs spiritual and intellectual endeavours towards the creation of 
a symbolic order within which it would be possible to continue a process 
that has been artificially broken off. Such an orientation is expressed by in-
adequate reactions to political reality, which means the domination of the 
political by the imaginary. The inadequacy of the imaginary in connection 
with reality is its attempt to rescue something whose existence no longer 
has any foundation in reality. Thus the present is no longer born of the past, 
but is transformed into an arena of the past, that is to say, of a projection of 
something that no longer exists. History is no longer separated from mod-
ern life, and an imagined continuity occupies the place of both. Grigol Or-
beliani in his poem Oh, Iberia! written in 1832 well expresses this attitude. In 
this poem, Georgia is compared to a ‘sheep that has no shepherd [monarchy, 
the sacralized representative of the state – authors’ note]. The abolition of the 
monarchy is imagined as a ‘terrible ruination’, and its restoration as a ‘divine 
duty’ and a ‘path of honour’. The ideal of statehood is placed in the past, in 
the era of Tamar and Davit (Tamar’s face in Betania Church; To Iarali), while 
the project of the future is the restoration of the past: ‘Who might bring to 
us the days of yore!’
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‘Language, Fatherland, Faith…’
The first person who radically changed the existing paradigm and who 
attempted to acknowledge the existing reality as a point of departure was 
Ilia Chavchavadze, to whose name is linked the beginning of the process of 
secularization.
Ilia’s secularization project has a literary basis. Its development is di-
rectly linked to the ‘Struggle between Fathers and Sons’ over the literary lan-
guage. In Ilia’s article ‘A few words on Prince Revaz Shalvas dze Eristavi’s 
translation of Kozlov’s The Insane’ published in The Dawn in 1861, father-
land, language and faith are mentioned as sacral signs. All three are ‘divine 
treasures’, but Ilia’s conception of the sacral differs radically from the ‘sacral’ 
of the ‘Fathers’.
Language 7
The ‘Fathers’’ conception of the literary language relied for support on 
Anton Bagrationi’s grammar and rhetoric. As a principle of the structuring 
of language and literature, Bagrationi’s grammar and rhetoric had a meta-
structural core within itself in a compact form which, in its loose form, gives 
us a certain cosmogony. This core is not only specifically linked to linguis-
tic and literary issues, but in the same way expresses the medieval Georgian 
world, the reality of which no longer existed in Ilia’s period. Ilia contrasted 
the idea of progress with the past of the ‘Fathers’’ generation, a world view 
aimed at the restoration of forms that were already inadequate for that time. 
By his conception of history as progress, Ilia on the one hand treats it in the 
context of modernity, while on the other hand he is laying the foundation 
for a fundamental re-evaluation of Georgian history. Let us first of all focus 
on the general context. If we rely on the German philosopher Karl Löwith’s 
thesis, the philosophy of the history of modernity is concentrated on a uni-
versal conception of progress and, for its part, it represents the outcome of 
the secularization of the Christian ‘theology of history’. In this revolutionary 
time, progress occupies the place of Fate, and Man – the absolute subject of 
history – that of God. In spite of this, historical theology and its secular ex-
pression, a belief in progress, have a common ‘future-centric’ conception of 
time. According to this model, time hurries cumulatively and without hin-
drance towards its future goal. In Karl Löwith’s view, it is impossible to com-
prehend this model without its links to the Judaeo-Christian matrix of mod-
ern times: ‘that modern philosophy of history will fit in with a biblical belief 
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in future fulfilment, and that it will end with the secularization of the escha-
tological ideal’8. For Ilia, the abolition of the Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti sig-
nifies a radical break in the historical sequence and is equivalent to an es-
chatological catastrophe: ‘The incremental chain of life has burst, the bridge 
between the present and the past has fallen, the following hour has broken 
with the first… The natural double flow of life has ceased, has stopped.’ This 
collapse was the outcome, not of an evolution or revolution, but rather of an 
eschatologically understood political catastrophe. In Ilia’s view, the sequence 
between the Bagrationis’ kingdom and the new Georgia has been discontin-
ued. A radical caesura separates these two Georgias9. 
Making sense of this eschatological catastrophe leads Ilia to a radically 
different opinion from Grigol Orbeliani. Ilia recognizes a return of the past 
is impossible – ‘We have killed grief over past times’ (Mother Georgia) – and 
stresses the project of the future. The philosophy of the history of moderni-
ty has preserved the idea that developments only make sense when they are 
linked to some goal or other, which brings about their transcendence. The 
secularized philosophy of Ilia’s history deals with the same subject matter, 
but in the same way Ilia’s ‘future-centric’ subject matter has totally differing 
aims from the general European. Killing thought of past time, in the final 
analysis, serves a certain future goal, which means the pursuit of alternative 
principles of political unity. For Ilia, the concept of fatherland became such 
a principle, a common concept (an idea) and a goal that motivates history 
and creates its subject matter. That ‘collective, lofty, whole idea which each 
one of us should see in Georgianness’ is the ‘fatherland’, which means the 
‘homeland of the whole people’. In his language reform, instead of medieval 
ecclesiastical Georgian, Ilia turns the vernacular into the literary language, 
and creates Georgian secular discourse. This splits the ecclesiastical and the 
national languages. The new literary language is already comprehensible and 
acceptable to the broad masses, which turns literature into the most powerful 
mass medium. And if we imagine the new literary language as the main me-
dia instrument, then it is through its channels that dissemination of the na-
tional narrative should happen. The new language instils in particular a new 
world and its centre, the ‘fatherland’. The concept of fatherland is indeed the 
basis of the existence of the nation state, which in the new political lexicon 
follows directly from secularization.
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‘My Fatherland, My Beloved, When Will You Blossom?’
”Fatherland” (mamuli) is based on a common heritage in Eastern and 
Western Christendom. From a terminological perspective, this word derives 
from the Greek patris and the Latin patria, although it originally denoted na-
tive city or place. This term had already undergone its first essential altera-
tion in the Roman Empire, when in the Latin formula pro patria mori (the 
heroization and apotheosis of warriors fallen for the fatherland) it already 
meant not only a place of origin but also the Roman Empire with all its in-
stitutions and system of values10. In early Christianity, this conception was 
replaced by the paradigm of the crucifixion of the Saviour as the ‘perfect sac-
rifice’. The classic emotional values of fatherland experienced a renaissance 
in Western Christendom in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (basically as 
a consequence of the Crusades), and slightly earlier in Byzantium and Geor-
gia. ‘The conception of “fatherland”… overstepped the old limits of the town 
and came into contact with the national kingdom, with the “royal crown”, as 
a visible symbol of national and territorial unity.’ Fatherland as a conception 
of one’s own country or homeland appears in eighteenth-century Europe, 
where it loses the essence of feudal land ownership and is transformed into 
the designation of collective identity and into the subject of loyalty. This gives 
rise to the term ‘imagined community’, where it occupies a central place. The 
particular subject of loyalty towards this unity is not the monarch, who per-
sonified the state in medieval times, but homeland or fatherland. To illustrate 
the secular essence of ‘fatherland’, Carl Schmitt has the French revolution-
ary writers periphrase the famous words of Louis XIV ‘I am the state!’ as ‘La 
patrie, c’est moi’ (‘I am the fatherland’)11. At a time when in Western Europe 
secularization occurred with the transfer of the term corpus mysticum to 
the people and the ‘fatherland’, in Eastern Christendom the possessor of the 
sacral was not the ‘fatherland’ but the king, more correctly, fatherland and 
king were equated with each other. 
The task that faced Ilia Chavchavadze was to establish a principle which 
would serve to unify Georgians and to define their collective identity. A frag-
mented Georgia within the Russian Empire, albeit with the status of one of its 
provinces, did however become unified. A politically united people did not 
find themselves in their own state, that is to say, their unity did not assume 
the form of a political subject. Under such circumstances, a unifying factor 
had to be found which, in colonial conditions, unites the people through a 
common cultural memory and purposefulness (intentio populi). If the loss 
of the state is an eschatological catastrophe, Ilia confronts this with the so-
called counter-present method. This method is directed towards the creation 
11
Secularization and Its Vicissitudes in Georgia
of a type of mythos which casts light on the present and gives hope for the 
future by promoting certain emphases on the past12. This is the central prin-
ciple of Ilia’s ‘fatherland’ narrative, which attributes an intentional sense to a 
mythical past and, on the basis of this, creates the project of the future (The 
poem The Shadow is an almost direct illustration of this principle.) The main 
mythological image (or mythologem) of the narrative of the strategy of the 
future in particular and, consequently, of the ‘fatherland’ as a whole, is Ilia’s 
invention of ‘Mother Georgia’ (The fact that the subtitle of Ilia Chavcha-
vadze’s poem Mother Georgia is ‘A scene from future life’ is no coincidence) 
who, in Ilia’s mythopoeic context, is a secular substitute for the Virgin Mary, 
something which derives its legitimacy from Nikoloz Gulaberisdze’s idea of 
Georgia being under the auspices of the Virgin Mary13. ‘Father’ as the rep-
resentational symbol of the state and the sovereign is to be found in the se-
mantics of ‘fatherland’. The function of its revival or resuscitation (‘Georgia, 
my fatherland, is reviving today!’) passes to ‘Mother Georgia’, who must rear 
brave men for the fatherland who are prepared to sacrifice themselves (‘Dar-
ling child, you sacrifice for the fatherland, you little Georgian!’).
Several fundamental substitutions which occur in the process of the 
creation of a new Georgia in the heart of literature are significant for our pa-
per. If the function of literature in Anton Bagrationi’s grammar and rhetoric 
was to convey the ‘divine truth’, in the case of Ilia, literature acquires a radi-
cally different function. The function of literature becomes conveying the 
idea of ‘fatherland’. ‘Fatherland’ occupies the place of divine truth, and it is 
owing to this substitution in particular that the sacralization of the fatherland 
and its subsequent transformation into the religion of a secular ‘fatherland’ 
occurs14. In Ilia’s narrative, a ‘restored fatherland’ gives birth to ‘love of the 
fatherland’ and to ‘patriotism’ (mamulishviloba). Self-sacrifice for the father-
land is considered the core value, the highest duty, and the aim of all patri-
ots. In this model, not only is reliance on the Christian paradigm of martyr-
dom significant, but also a more ancient and fundamental link between the 
sacral and the offering: in the eschatological struggle the offering acquires 
the function of a constituent factor of national unity15. The apotheosis of the 
patriot means self-sacrifice for his fatherland, it turns him into a hero and 
opens the way into a ‘heavenly Georgia’, a secular paradise in which immor-
tality is shifted into history.
The next significant substitution concerns the figure of the king. Fol-
lowing the catastrophe of 1801, that sacral place which was occupied in 
Georgian political theology by the Bagrationi dynasty and king was vacated. 
In this respect, the context of secularization in Georgia differed from West-
ern Europe and Russia. The placing of the poet and, later, the craftsman and 
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intellectual on the same level as the sovereign occurs in Western Europe in 
parallel with the political theories of the High and Late Middle Ages. More-
over, after Dante at the latest, the well-known aequiparatio of the poet with 
the sovereign is based not only on the classic example but also on Justin-
ian law16. Unlike the European Enlightenment, Georgian intellectuals did 
not have to struggle against the royal court or the Church. Secularization in 
Georgia did not follow a revolutionary path and, in actual fact, established it-
self in an empty – more correctly, vacated – space. With Ilia, the sacral space 
of the king is occupied by the secular figure of the poet-prophet-genius, who 
in the same way fulfils the functions of pontifex maximus of the secular ‘reli-
gion’ of the ‘fatherland’17. From the 1860s on Ilia created a new paradigm of 
Georgianness, which began with the desacralization of the high, ecclesiasti-
cal style of the ‘Fathers’ and ended in the transfer of the idea of the sacral to 
the ‘fatherland’. The ‘fatherland’ is Ilia’s faith, and the language, from whose 
heart the fatherland was born, is the expression of its ‘idea’. Ilia’s seculariza-
tion project is linked on the one hand to a secular idea of progress imported 
from Europe, which makes its appearance to us as one of the central motifs 
of Ilia’s social and political journalism, and on the other hand to the applica-
tion of this model to Georgian reality, which is manifested in the desacral-
ization of faith and the sacralization of the national.
Georgian society did not see through to a conclusion the secular project 
of the fatherland as the principle of the unity of political society. An expres-
sion of this was the interpretation of Ilia Chavchavadze’s life with the help of 
an old, monarchical theme. In Ilia’s own lifetime he was christened Georgia’s 
Uncrowned King and ‘Father of the Nation’ (Pater Patriae), that is to say, the 
function of representing the (non-existent) state was again conferred on the 
king and not on the ‘fatherland’. Thus Georgian political discourse again re-
turned to a presecular and premodern paradigm which lasted until the So-
viet period. Paradoxically, however, in the formally radically secular Soviet 
Union the monarchical paradigm found its expression in the form of Stalin-
ism. All the same, the monarchical paradigm had several independent sourc-
es in Soviet reality, first and foremost, Russian messianism which is based on 
the idea of Moscow as the third Rome. According to a historiosophical tradi-
tion which originates from Berdyaev, it was in the conditions of Soviet Russia 
that the idea of the Russian Empire as the Third Rome was truly realized18. It 
was in the Soviet Union in particular that medieval Eastern-Christian politi-
cal theology was revived in a secular Soviet form which, in the final analysis, 
ended in the Stalin period as Soviet Byzantinism. The phenomenon known 
as the cult of personality means in particular that Stalin became the sole 
representative of the state and supplanted not only the soviets, which had 
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already been left functionless, but also the very idea of the state (and of the 
homeland). Apart from the context of a general Soviet, basically Russian, po-
litical tradition, Stalin as a figure of a monarchical tradition also had a local 
Georgian context which, in the national discourse, directly connected him 
with Ilia Chavchavadze’s reception. It is no coincidence that Ilia Chavcha-
vadze’s Soviet ‘renaissance’ begins in1937 with a celebration of Ilia’s jubilee 
on a nationwide Soviet scale. In the Georgian context, Stalin is legitimized 
in the form of a continuer of Ilia Chavchavadze’s tradition in particular. (For 
this legitimization a mythos is formed about the discovery by Ilia of Stalin as 
a poet.) According to Zurab Kiknadze, in the Soviet Georgian mythos ‘there 
arose a messianistic interpretation of Ilia’s patriotic works’19. The infant ly-
ing in the golden cradle in Ilia’s Bazaleti Lake ‘whose name cannot be said’ 
and whom Georgians ‘long for with a silent yearning’ is equated with Sta-
lin in Soviet Georgian messianistic discourse. Thus Stalin to a certain extent 
became a symbol of national identity and a representative of Georgian mes-
sianism. The burial of Stalin’s mother, Ekaterine Jughashvili, in Mtatsminda 
Pantheon symbolically meant the ‘nationalization’ of the messiah’s mother, 
her promotion to eminence in the national pantheon. The Georgian public 
perceived the criticism of Stalin’s personality cult by the Twentieth Congress 
in 1956 as an attack on Georgia, underlining once more the figure of Sta-
lin as the identification of the Georgians. It can be said that a renaissance of 
Georgian nationalism began in post-Stalin Georgia, which for its part was 
the product of the mingling of already heterogeneous cultural codes. Ilia’s 
heroics in this discourse merged with Stalin’s heroics. The theocentric cult 
of personality shifted in its essence into the national discourse. If Ilia placed 
emphasis on the people’s history, in Soviet Georgia the political history (the 
‘history of kings’, in Ilia’s words) concentrated on specific figures again came 
into the foreground20. In the fine arts there are monuments depicting the 
same symbol as both an historical character and as a mythological character 
linked to history, from Vakhtang Gorgasali down to Mother Georgia21. Such 
a space created by historical and mythological monuments brings about an 
extrapolation of the past into modern times and, at the same time, it becomes 
the centre of the present. In spite of the active use of Ilia’s symbolism, Geor-
gian discourse after Stalin breaks the link with the future and transfers the 
symbolic centre to the past. Medieval Georgia and its heroes who have been 
transformed into monuments become the objects of society’s self-identifica-
tion. Thus the national discourse again becomes the expression of the pre-
secular paradigm.
The idea of Georgian statehood is linked, on the one hand, to Ilia 
Chavchavadze’s secular discourse, which is again described with the help of a 
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presecular model and, on the other, to an idealized medieval Georgian state-
hood, similarly as an historical space created by the characters of Georgian po-
litical and cultural history and which, for its part, bears serious traces of a So-
viet historicism of Stalinist vintage. Secular and presecular forms are confused 
in the perception of Georgian society to such an extent that a secular figure 
(Ilia Chavchavadze) is perceived as perpetuating a presecular tradition (Saint 
Ilia the Righteous) and not as a reformer, and historical space takes the form 
of a secularized pantheon. Such syncretism creates that cultural environment 
in which the national movement and the modern idea of Georgian indepen-
dent statehood are born. The Georgian national idea (the so-called ‘forgotten 
idea’) for its part is orientated towards the past. This idea implies a messian-
istic re-evaluation of the medieval political discourse. Georgian messianism, 
as whose authors we may regard Akaki Bakradze and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
is the outcome of a whole range of projections in which medieval political 
models are refracted in the prism of Stalin’s secular messianism. In this very 
context, the demand for Ilia Chavchavadze’s canonization by the future lead-
ers of the national movement and his canonization in 1987 constituted, in ac-
tual fact, the founding act of the building of the new Georgian state. Its inter-
pretation is particularly interesting owing to this status. On the one hand, the 
Georgian Orthodox Church absorbs the ‘author’ of Georgian secularization, 
appropriates him and thus levels the whole secular discourse. In actual fact, it 
takes back that dominant role in discoursive and symbolic functions which Ilia 
Chavchavadze had taken away from it. Thus the modern Georgian state begins 
with a symbolic countersecularizational act. However, the Georgian Ortho-
dox Church is itself transformed by this act. If the fatherland held the status 
of the sacral in Ilia Chavchavadze’s secular discourse, and he fatherland itself 
had turned into church and (national) unity, by canonizing Ilia Chavchavadze 
the Church became the upholder of the discourse on the fatherland in secu-
lar space and, in actual fact, thereby appeared as a national (secular) Church. 
The nationalization of the Church was nicely expressed by the term ‘Heavenly 
Georgia’, which the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia II, introduced. ‘Heav-
enly Georgia’ meant particularly the transposition of Georgian historical space 
into sacral space. ‘Heavenly Georgia’ responds to the concept of a ‘Heavenly Je-
rusalem’ following the Judgement (Revelation 21-22). In the Georgian context, 
this meant the creation of an ideal state following the eschatological catastro-
phe of the loss of statehood, one which, for its part, was a reflection of the ide-
alized medieval Georgian state. The most radical expression of the seculariza-
tion and syncretization of Christian theology was the new formula introduced 
by Ilia II from Easter Night, 1989: ‘Christ has risen, Georgia has risen!’ which 
implied equating Corpus Christi Mysticum, the Body of Christ, with Georgia. 
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By this the Church had, in actual fact, confronted secular messianism with its 
own messianistic idea, so the secularization of the sacral ‘Heavenly Jerusalem’ 
– its being made earthly – took the form of its nationalization.
The nationalism of the Church did not remain solely in discoursive 
space. The Church filled an ideological vacuum in the post-Soviet period. 
The new Georgian state attempts to use Church as an ideological instrument. 
This process is directly linked to Georgia’s second president, Eduard She-
vardnadze. Shevardnadze’s inauguration in Svetitskhoveli Cathedral served 
to strengthen his political legitimacy, and carried a nuance of the revival of 
the form of state representation abolished in 1801. An alliance between the 
state and the new ideological force was formalized in a Constitutional Agree-
ment in 2003 which acknowledged the special role of the Church in Georgian 
history and also granted significant privileges to the Church.
The model of modern Georgian statehood, conceived in the heart of the 
national movement and of the Georgian Orthodox Church, sees the future 
Georgia in an antiquated paradigm. Such a model in itself assumes the exis-
tence of a strong charismatic leader, a reincarnation of Davit Aghmashene-
beli, Ilia Chavchavadze or Ioseb Jughashvili. The political history of Georgia 
has evolved over the past eighteen years around the particular theme of the 
creation and overthrow of such leaders (to the extent that the ideal concep-
tion of a charismatic leader and the consensus of real political groups dif-
fer radically from each other). In these conditions, the Georgian Orthodox 
Church attempted to find an alternative ‘solution’ within the framework of 
the existing model, and to bring the idea of a charismatic leader to its logi-
cal conclusion. Since Georgian society cannot agree on the ‘identity’ of the 
leader, the identification figure, the representative of the Georgian state, must 
once again be a member of the Bagrationi dynasty who will be brought up in 
the bosom of the Church. Ilia’s ‘Heaven appoints me and the people rear me’ 
changes its mode and is transformed into the triteness of medieval political 
theology. The Church and sacral unity again occupy the place of the nation 
and secular unity. Support for this initiative by society at large is an indica-
tor that the political and social elites made use of modern democratic ideals 
and values on a rhetorical level only.
The formation of a modern state is directly linked to conceptualizing 
its founding principles; as for Georgian political thought, it is locked in the 
vicious circle of a totally different presecular paradigm. Ilia Chavchavadze’s 
secular project directed toward the future has been replaced by national-re-
ligious syncretism orientated toward the past. This in itself implies a funda-
mental ideological unsuitability for the project of modernization which is es-
sential for the formation of a modern state.
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